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Abstract
We consider anonymous games with an atomless probability space
of players in which players’ characteristics are countable. Our main
result shows that the set of equilibrium distributions coincides with the
set of distributions induced by equilibrium strategies together with the
function assigning characteristics to players. This results implies the
existence of Nash equilibria in continuous large games with countable
characteristics.
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1 Introduction
Based on the work of Hildenbrand (1974) and Hart, Hildenbrand, and Kohlberg
(1974), Mas-Colell (1984) formulated the equilibrium notion of large anony-
mous games in terms of distributions. In this way, he departed from the usual
formalization of an equilibrium as a strategy, i.e., as a measurable function
from players into actions. This allowed him to obtain an existence theorem
easily and under general conditions.
Since an equilibrium distribution is a probability distribution over char-
acteristics and actions, it does not tell us what actions does each player takes
in an equilibrium. Rather, and loosely, it tells us only the fraction of players
with a certain characteristic that play a certain action. This is obviously in
contrast with equilibrium strategies. Motivated by this, and despite the ease
and generality that Mas-Colell’s approach allows, researchers still investigate
properties of equilibrium strategies (see the recent survey by Khan and Sun
(2002)).
It is clear that the two approaches are related. In the concrete case of
a game described by a measurable function from players into characteristics
(i.e., payoff functions), this function together with an equilibrium strategy
induces an equilibrium distribution of the game. Our main result shows that
for games with countable characteristics the converse also holds. Thus, for
such games, a distribution is an equilibrium distribution if and only if it is
induced by a Nash equilibrium strategy together with the function assigning
payoff function to the players.1
1A similar but weaker result holds when the action space is finite (see Rath (1995,
Theorem 8) or when it is countable and the distribution over characteristics is atomless
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An important consequence of our result is that it yields a general exis-
tence theorem for equilibrium strategies in games with an uncountable ac-
tion space. Thus, in contrast to the view expressed in Khan, Rath, and Sun
(1997), it is possible to extend the equilibrium theory for anonymous games
beyond the case of countable action space. The extension we present requires,
however, that players’ characteristics be countable. Hence, our results stress
the importance of countability assumptions for the existence of equilibrium
strategies in games with a continuum of players, highlighted in Khan, Rath,
and Sun (1997), but they show that those assumptions can be imposed either
on the action space or on players’ characteristics.
2 Definitions and the Main Results
Let A be a non-empty, complete and separable metric space of actions en-
dowed with its Borel σ – algebra and M(A) be the set of Borel proba-
bility measures on A endowed with the weak convergence topology. By
Parthasarathy (1967, Theorems II.6.2 and II.6.5), it follows that M(A) is
a complete, separable metric space. Let U be a metric space of utility func-
tions u : A ×M(A) → R endowed with its Borel σ – algebra. The set U
represents the space of players’ characteristics.
A game with a continuum of players is characterized by an atomless prob-
ability space of players (T,Σ, λ) and a measurable function U : T → U . We
represent such game by G = ((T,Σ, λ), U, A). A game G has countable char-
(see Khan and Sun (1995a, Theorem 1)). The examples of Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997)
show that these representation results do not extent beyond the case of either countable
actions or countable characteristics.
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acteristics if U(T ) is a countable subset of U .
Let Uc denote the space of continuous utility functions u : A×M(A)→ R
endowed with the supremum norm; it is a complete, separable metric space.
A game G is continuous if A is compact and U = Uc.
Given a Borel probability measure τ on U × A, we denote by τU and τA
the marginals of τ on U and A respectively. The expression u(a, τ) ≥ u(A, τ)
means u(a, τ) ≥ u(a′, τ) for all a′ ∈ A.
Given a game G with a continuum of players, a Borel probability measure
τ on U×A is an equilibrium distribution for G if τU = λ◦U−1 and τ({(u, a) ∈
U × A : u(a, τA) ≥ u(A, τA)}) = 1.
We will use the following notation: Bτ = {(u, a) ∈ U × A : u(a, τA) ≥
u(A, τA)}. For a general game G with a continuum of players, an implicit
requirement for τ to be an equilibrium distribution is that Bτ is measurable.
Note that if G is continuous, then Bτ is closed, and so a Borel set; hence
τ(Bτ ) is well defined for all distributions τ ∈M(Uc × A).
A pure strategy is a measurable function f : T → A. A pure strategy f is
a Nash equilibrium of G if U(t)(f(t), λ ◦ f−1) ≥ U(t)(A, λ ◦ f−1) for almost
all t ∈ T .
For games with countable characteristics we obtain a strong representa-
tion theorem: the set of equilibrium distributions coincides with the set of
distributions induced by Nash equilibria and the function U describing the
game.
Theorem 1 Let G be a game with countable characteristics. If τ is an
equilibrium distribution of G, then there exists a Nash equilibrium f : T → A
such that τ = λ ◦ (U, f)−1.
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As noted by Khan and Sun (1999, p. 474), the conclusion of Theorem 1
is valid when the space of players is a hyperfinite Loeb counting space even
without the restriction of countable characteristics. In contrast, the strength
of Theorem 1 is that it holds for all atomless probability spaces of players.
The idea of the proof of Theorem 1 is simple: we define as many probabil-
ity measures over the action space as the number of possible characteristics.
Each such measure describes the distribution of choices made by players with
a given characteristic. A modified version of Skorokhod’s theorem allows us
to represent any such measure by a function defined on the set of players with
the corresponding characteristic. Then, it is easy to see that these functions
define the equilibrium strategy.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let G a be game with countable characteristics
and τ be an equilibrium distribution of G. We claim that there exists a
measurable function f : T → A such that τ = λ ◦ (U, f)−1.
The proof of the above claim is as follows: Let U(T ) = {ui}∞i=1. For
each i ∈ N, let Ti = U−1({ui}), ci = λ(Ti) and, if ci > 0, λi(E) = λ(E)/ci
for all measurable subsets E of Ti. Furthermore, again if ci > 0, define
τi(D) = τ({ui}×D)/ci for all measurable subsets D of A. Then, there exists
a measurable function fi : Ti → A such that τi = λi ◦ f−1i .2
Define f : T → A by f(t) = fi(t) if t ∈ Ti and ci > 0, while if t ∈
T \ (∪i:ci>0Ti), we define f(t) arbitrarily. Note that λ(T \ (∪i:ci>0Ti)) = 0 and
so f is measurable.
2The existence of such fi can be obtained by appropriately modifying the proof of
Skorokhod (1956, Theorem 3.1.1, p. 281). We need only to redefine the sets ∆i1,...,ik ,
using the fact that Ti is atomless to guarantee that λi(∆i1,...,ik) = τi(Si1,...,ik), where the
sets Si1,...,ik are as in Skorokhod’s proof.
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Let B be a measurable subset of U ×A and define Bi = {a ∈ A : (ui, a) ∈
B} for all i ∈ N. Note that {ui}×Bi = ({ui}×A)∩B and so, in particular,
{ui} × Bi is measurable. Also, note that τ(B) = τ((U(T ) × A) ∩ B) and
λ ◦ (U, f)−1(B) = λ ◦ (U, f)−1((U(T )× A) ∩B). Then,
τ(B) = τ((U(T )× A) ∩B) =
∑
i
τ({ui} × Bi)
=
∑
i
ciτi(Bi) =
∑
i
ciλi ◦ f−1i (Bi).
(1)
Also,
λ ◦ (U, f)−1(B) = λ({t ∈ T : (U(t), f(t)) ∈ B})
=
∑
i
λ({t ∈ T : U(t) = ui and f(t) ∈ Bi}) =
∑
i
λ({t ∈ Ti : fi(t) ∈ Bi})
=
∑
i
ciλi({t ∈ Ti : fi(t) ∈ Bi}) =
∑
i
ciλi ◦ f−1i (Bi).
(2)
Thus, it follows that τ = λ ◦ (U, f)−1.
To finish the argument, we claim that f is a Nash equilibrium of G. As
is easily seen, we have that (U, f)−1(Bτ ) = {t ∈ T : U(t)(f(t), λ ◦ f−1) ≥
U(t)(A, λ ◦ f−1)}. Since τ = λ ◦ (U, f)−1 is an equilibrium distribution, then
λ((U, f)−1(Bτ )) = 1 and so λ({t ∈ T : U(t)(f(t), λ ◦ f−1) ≥ U(t)(A, λ ◦
f−1)}) = 1. Thus, f is a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1 has an important consequence when applied to continuous
games. If G is a continuous game, then, by Mas-Colell (1984, Theorem 1),
G has an equilibrium distribution τ . Moreover, if G is also a game with
countable characteristics, then τ = λ ◦ (U, f)−1 and f is a Nash equilibrium
of G. Therefore, G has a Nash equilibrium. Thus, Theorem 1 implies the
existence of Nash equilibria for continuous games with a continuum of players
and countable characteristics.
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Corollary 1 A Nash equilibrium exists for all continuous games with count-
able characteristics.
We note that this result parallels Theorem 10 in Khan and Sun (1995b),
which is obtained with a countable action space but without any restriction
on characteristics (besides measurability).3 Similarly, by replacing the as-
sumption of countable action by that of countable characteristics, we can
obtain results that correspond to Theorem 1, Theorem 2 and Corollary 3 of
Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997).
Furthermore, it follows from Khan and Sun (1999, Theorem 1) that the
restriction of countable characteristics is not needed for the conclusion of
Corollary 1 when the space of players is a Loeb space.
We emphasize that for Corollary 1, as well as for Theorem 1 in Khan and
Sun (1999), the action space can be uncountable. The difference is that our
result, by imposing the assumption of countable characteristics, dispenses
with the use of a particular type of players’ spaces. In this way, it is the
first result on the existence of an equilibrium strategy for games with an
arbitrarily atomless probability space of players and an action space that is
just a compact metric space.
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